This article examines the role of locality (ethnic composition of the constituency) and temporality (the almost five-year hiatus between elections) for BN in the parliamentary
Introduction
Parliamentary elections in Malaysia are hotly contested affairs. The March 2004 11 th General Elections were billed to be one of, if not, the most interesting yet. Abdullah Badawi, Mahathir Mohammad's handpicked successor who had only in October 2003 been appointed as Prime Minister and leader of UMNO, led the Barisan Nasional (National Front, henceforth referred to as BN) 1 campaign. His popular image and credentials as "Mr Clean" and "Mr Religious" was deemed to augur well for BN, bleaching it of various allegations of mismanagement, cronyism, corruption and, more importantly, bridging the bitter factions in the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the leading member of BN. There was also widespread belief that the country could witness a repeat of the oppositional coalition Barisan Alternatif's (Alternative Coalition, henceforth referred to as BA) strong performance in the 1999 general elections. Defying speculation, BN emerged victorious to win a two-thirds parliamentary majority, capturing 64 per cent of the popular votes, a little short of the stunning 65 per cent it won in the 1985 elections. Dr Mahathir Mohamad, whose resignation as Prime Minister came just a few months shy of the general elections, had enough magnanimity to suggest his departure from the political limelight after 22 years in office -a factor that may indeed have worked to the BN's advantageallowed it to make a turnaround. 2 Adopting an approach that divides the electorate into different bandwidths or frequencies based on ethnic composition of the constituencies, the article compares and juxtaposes the voting pattern and trends of the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections. It argues that temporality, i.e. the hiatus of nearly five years between elections, and locality in terms of ethnic composition of the constituency, were vital for BN securing two-thirds majority. The article begins with an overview of BN and non-BN 3 electoral performance in the 2004 parliamentary elections. The next section discusses temporality and locality on BN's performance by subjecting the election data to statistical analysis using the multinomial logits saturated model. The conclusion summarizes the main points.
The Elections in Malaysia
In the 2004 parliamentary elections the BN won 181 of the 202 seats that were contested and 17 uncontested seats, bringing its total to 198 seats. The remaining 21 seats were won by the non-BN comprising the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) and Parti Keadilan Malaysia (National Justice Party, Keadilan) and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) which together merged in a loose coalition called the Alternative Front (Barisan Alternatif, BA) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP).
4 Table 1 shows how the parties fared in the 14 States. Table 2 shows seats won by the respective political parties and their percentage share of popular votes.
The BN managed to retain the 3 seats in Perlis up for grabs, while increasing its share in Kedah from 7 to 14 of the 23 seats it contested. In Kelantan the BN increased its share of seats from one to Ratnam and Milne (1970) point to the importance of location in the sense of constituency type for parliamentary elections. Employing categories such as rural, urban, quasi urban, and "others" and associating them with particular ethnic groups, they seek to show how the votes actually went in the 1969 parliamentary elections in West Malaysia. To be sure, the 10 May 1969 general elections has a special place in Malaysia's postcolonial history because three days after those elections Kuala Lumpur and its immediate vicinity became the scene of bloody racial riots. There is an obvious link between the Alliance's 5 (precursor of the BN) miserable showing in the elections and the racial pogroms suggesting how germane winning two-thirds majority, which the Alliance failed to secure, is for political stability.
It is popularly contended that the Alliance's poor performance in the 1969 parliamentary elections was a direct result of a swing in nonMalay support for the opposition, in particular the DAP. However, Ratnam and Milne (1970) whose study among other things was concerned with the trend in the "communal votes", showed that the Alliance had lost more of the Malay votes than the non-Malay ones. Victory processions by DAP were seen as provocative, triggering violent retaliation from Malay nationalists. Bigots on both sides were not concerned with such precision or veracity; mistaken estimates were legitimized to bring the dogs of war out for a fight resulting in race riots.
The National Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in 1970 to ensure political stability and prevent further racial unrest by addressing Malay concerns for more equitable wealth distribution and restructuring society to eliminate the ethnically defined occupational structure. Malays were predominantly in subsistence agriculture while, by and large, the Chinese were concentrated in urban areas and the Indians in plantation estates.
But apart from this singular and isolated scar in 1969, the body politic has been in the main unblemished. That the BN has consistently won two-thirds majority in all parliamentary elections since its debut in 1974 would indicate that the NEP has contributed to political stability.
An examination of voting trends indicates the important role played by what Ratnam and Milne have described as the anti-communal vote for BN. Typically denoting a tactical voting strategy which finds a Malay voting for a non-Malay candidate from either Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) or Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) rather than a candidate from the DAP. The aim is to deny the latter, which articulates a Malaysian Malaysia ideology, victory as the DAP is largely perceived as serving non-Malay interests. A similar rationale informs non-Malay voters who would rather vote for a Malay candidate from UMNO than a candidate from the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), which most non-Malays perceive as serving a Malay-Islamic agenda. This voting tactic which predominates in the mixed constituencies where no single "communal group" has a high majority in the electorate, works to the advantage of BN, the Alliance's successor, providing it with political mileage as it packages itself as an intercommunal party. In 1969, Ratnam and Milne noted that the nonAlliance parties have been able to make inroads in this category of the electorate too, suggesting that the Alliance cannot continue to depend on the electorate behaving so predictably. To be sure, anti-communal voting has continued to be important for BN, the Alliance's successor. Ratnam and Milne add the caveat one must therefore be careful not to misinterpret these findings. While it is clear that the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association, an Alliance and subsequently BN member) is not very popular among the non-Malays it would be wrong to conclude that non-Malays in any way prefer the UMNO. The point may also be made that, despite its poor showing the MCA … even if it cannot attract sufficient support for its own candidates, its links with UMNO at least helps to make it more acceptable to Malays. 6 However, Ratnam and Milne's employment of terms such as urban, rural, and quasi-urban to denote the categories of electorate are, like all previous studies of Malaysian politics, wanting. Scant attention is given to defining how the above concepts are used (Mauzy 1979 , Mauzy 1983 , Means 1991 , Muzaffar 1982 , Crouch 1980 , Gomez 1996 , Khong 1991 , Ratnam and Milne 1967 , Sankaran and Adnan 1988 , Strauch 1978 , Loh and Saravanamuttu 2003 . To be sure, the status of constituencies change over time, depending on the rate of economic development of particular States in the federation, and the use of "others" as an ethnic category is ambiguous. Categories such as rural, urban, coastal, riverine, highland, inland, working class, middle class, elites, must be problematized and grappled with so that they may be employed meaningfully with a measure of precision. The best official categorizations in Malaysia are those employed by the Land Office for calculating quit rent. Using such categorizations however, would have an electoral constituency such as Gelugor in Penang Island being defined as rural when a significant proportion of the denizens are professional rich and middle class. This raises valid questions regarding the accuracy of terms employed and the issues that must be taken into account when defining constituencies as urban or rural.
Such simplistic dispensation however, is not confined to the use of categories but also the manner in which general inferences are made from voting patterns. Thus, for example Loh and Saravanamuttu (2002) in their partisan pro-Reformasi study of the 1999 elections made unqualified assertions such as rural voting patterns are more predictable than urban voting behaviour almost exclusively by looking at percentage changes in voting. Their hypothesis, premised on percentage changes without the rigors of statistical analysis, would have us accept subjective adjectives such as "high" and "low" to describe electoral support. What is considered a high or low percentage is at best ambiguous and debatable.
A cursory glance of Malaysia's Constitution would show the salience of ethnicity for politics. The two classes of citizens, the bumiputera and non-bumiputera, is a product of UMNO-led ethno-nationalism wherein the goal of ensuring Malay ethnic political dominance is central. employment opportunities in the form of quotas. The postcolonial government's brief however deepened this policy through the NEP by expanding Malay corporate wealth ownership. It must be stated here that Malay laments over the pattern of wealth distribution ignores the fact that it was through the exploitation of Indian and Chinese labour in the rubber and tin industries respectively that that wealth was created. The NEP in essence cemented the discriminatory British policies vis à vis the Indians and Chinese in Malaysia.
Thus, what underpins and underwrites the delineation of electoral boundaries and constituencies are ethnic considerations, against which background the electorate is categorized in the following section.
Locality and Ethnic Demographics
To analyse BN's performance in the parliamentary elections, constituencies have been categorized based on the bumiputera percentage of the electorate: (a) bumiputera minority constituencies where bumiputera constitute less than 30 per cent of the electorate, (b) bumiputera high majority constituencies where they constitute 60 per cent and above but below 80 per cent, (c) bumiputera absolute majority constituencies where they constitute more than 80 per cent of the electorate and, (d) the mixed constituencies where the bumiputera electorate constitute between 30-59 per cent. It is assumed that the make up of mixed constituencies poses challenges to a political party to win solely on the votes of a single ethnic group. Thus, even in the top one-third band of this category i.e. where bumiputera constitute 50-59 per cent of the electorate, even a ten per cent split in bumiputera votes would imply that a political party seeking to win must secure enough non-bumiputera votes. This scenario does not obtain in bumiputera majority or bumiputera minority categories where a party can win purely on the support of a single ethnic group. Table 3 In 1999, a total of 192 parliamentary seats were up for grabs. This precludes the one seat won by BN uncontested. Fifty-eight of the contested seats were in mixed constituencies, 115 in the bumiputera majority range of which 70 were in the bumiputera absolute majority category while 45 were in the high majority category, and 19 seats where non-bumiputera are in the majority. The mixed seats accounted for 30.2 per cent of the total number of seats, bumiputera majority constituencies 60 per cent, and non-bumiputera majority constituencies 10 per cent. The BN won 56 or 96.5 per cent of seats contested in mixed categories. Its share of seats won in the two categories of bumiputera majority constituencies was 69.6 per cent or 80 seats -42 in bumiputera absolute majority areas and 38 in the 60-79 per cent range. In the bumiputera minority constituencies the BN captured 11 seats or 58 per cent of the contested seats. In terms of the total 147 seats won by the BN: 38.1 per cent were from mixed constituencies, 54.4 per cent from bumiputera majority constituencies, and 7.5 per cent from bumiputera minority constituencies. The BA won 2 or 3.4 per cent of seats in the mixed constituencies. In the bumiputera majority category, BA's share was 30.4 per cent or 35 seats, 28 seats in the bumiputera absolute majority category and 7 in the 60-70 per cent range. In the bumiputera minority category BA won 8 seats or 42 per cent. In terms of the total 45 seats won by BA: 9 per cent were in mixed constituencies, 78 per cent in bumiputera majority constituencies, and 18 per cent in non-bumiputera majority constituencies.
Hence, it is clear that the major challenge to BN comes from bumiputera and non-bumiputera majority constituencies with BA being able to capture in the region of 32 per cent, close to a third of seats in these categories. While doing well in these constituencies is vital, it is the performance of the BN in mixed constituencies where the non-BN challenge is weakest that helps the former win such a large majority. In this category of electorate anti-communal voting is definitely working to undermine BA, in particular PAS and DAP. And arguably, it is the BN's performance in this category of electorate which enabled it to defeat BA in what was perhaps Malaysia's most challenging election.
In the 2004 parliamentary elections DAP pulled out of BA. The DAP elite and their constituency were not impressed with PAS's push for hudud law, the Islamic penal code, in Kelantan and Terengganu after its 1999 victory. There was also a 4 per cent increase in the electorate and if taking this fact into consideration, there was an increase in the total number of seats up for grabs to 202. This precludes the 17 seats BN won uncontested. Sixty-two or 30.7 per cent of the total number of seats were in the bumiputera absolute majority category, 50 in the bumiputera high majority category, and 22 seats or 10.9 per cent in the bumiputera minority category. Mixed constituencies accounted for 68 seats or 33.6 per cent. Table 3 shows the different categories of the electorate and the share of seats held by the BN and non-BN in 1999 and 2004. BN captured 67 seats or 98.5 per cent of seats contested in mixed constituencies. It won 104 seats or 93 per cent in the bumiputera majority constituencies of which 55 seats or 49 per cent were in bumiputera absolute majority constituencies and 43.7 per cent where bumiputera were in the 60-79 per cent range. In the bumiputera minority category BN won 10 seats or 45.4 per cent. In terms of the total 181 seats won, mixed constituencies accounted for 37 per cent, bumiputera majority 57.4 per cent and bumiputera minority 5.5 per cent.
The DAP won one seat or 1.5 per cent of seats contested in mixed constituencies. BA's share in bumiputera majority constituencies was 8 seats or 7.1 per cent of total seats in this category whereby its share in bumiputera absolute majority constituencies was 7 seats or 6.2 per cent and one seat or 0.9 per cent in the bumiputera high majority category. In the bumiputera minority category DAP won 12 seats or 54.5 per cent of seats contested. In terms of the total 21 seats won by non-BN (9 by DAP and 12 by BA): 4.8 per cent came from the mixed constituencies, 38.1 per cent from bumiputera majority constituencies and 57.1 per cent from bumiputera minority constituencies.
A The above analysis allows four hypotheses on the Malaysian parliamentary elections: one, locality in terms of the ethnic composition of the electorate having a significant bearing on elections; two, the redrawing of electoral boundaries has worked to BN's advantage; three, the dependability of the mixed constituencies and the anti-communal voting employed there works overwhelmingly in BN's favour; and four, the first-past-the-post system as a mechanism helps BN as it causes votes by losing parties to be wasted since the system operates on a winner-takes-all basis.
Temporality
Estimating the anti-communal votes in mixed constituencies is difficult as it is not possible to know how an individual actually voted and, short of a more detailed study based on voting behaviour in individual polling booths in a particular constituency, the best that can be done is to calculate the odds. Dividing the total votes won by BN in 2004 which was 1,865,557 with the votes won by non-BN as a whole, which was 812,937 in the mixed category an odds of voting BN of 2.3 times can be discerned. This contrasts with the odds of voting BN in bumiputera minority constituencies which was 1.01 times, obtained by dividing the total votes won by the BN i.e. 451,165 with the total votes won by the non-BN i.e. 443,339. Combining bumiputera majority constituencies with constituencies where bumiputera are in the minority and designating them as non-mixed constituencies (i.e. bumiputera majority and bumiputera minority) the ratio of votes in mixed to non-mixed constituencies expressed in terms of the odds of voting BN in 2004 was 1.5 times higher. The odds-ratio of mixed to non-mixed constituencies obtained by dividing the odds of voting BN in mixed constituencies (i.e. 2.3) by the odds in non-mixed constituencies (i.e. 1.5) was 1.5 times, indicating the choice for BN is one and a half times higher in a mixed category than non-mixed category. When the data for 2004 and 1999 are compared for mixed constituencies a voting trend in favour of BN i.e. 1.5 times was discerned for 2004 indicating that the odds had gone up. In 1999 the odds in favour of BN in a mixed constituency was 1.26 times.
To measure the extent to which choice of party might differ across categories of electorate and if the four-and-half year hiatus between elections (i.e. temporality) affects voter decision, the multinomial logits saturated model was developed and applied to 1999 and 2004 election data.
9 This model will help to measure voting trends in 2004 relative to 1999 by calculating probabilities, odds, and the odds-ratio of voting BN in different categories of electorate. The saturated model had to be applied whence given its zero degrees of freedom would result in a perfect fit between model and data. Thus, odds can be expressed in the form of a log-linear equation ln (m ij ) = α i + β j + γ ij …… (1) where m ij indicate say the expected number of votes based on i = 1 or 2 (1 representing mixed constituencies and 2, non-mixed constituencies), j = 1 or 2 (1 representing the vote for BN and 2, non-BN). The log of the odds m ij are set equal to parameters: α i , the main effect of votes cast by constituency type and β j, the main effect of choice of party during voting and γ ij , the interaction effect between constituency votes and party choice.
The log-odds may thus be represented by logit
which expresses the difference in voting outcome, i.e., β j j =1,2 whether BN or opposition on the basis of different in constituency types γ ij i = 1,2, whether mixed or non-mixed. It is possible to interpret the logit in terms of probabilities by the transformation:
) or in terms of odds-ratio e L …… (3) Applying the model to the data set found in Table 5 logits, probabilities, odds and odds ratio obtained are given in Tables 6 to 8 . The above tables seek to show contrasting scenarios by comparing mixed constituencies with bumiputera majority constituencies, bumiputera absolute majority constituencies and bumiputera minority constituencies. The probabilities, odds and odds-ratios obtained are derived from equation (3).
It can be observed that the probability of a voter in a mixed constituency voting BN in 2004 was 69.6 per cent and 60.1 per cent in 1999. In terms of odds, the voter in a mixed constituency indicated 2.3 to 1 odds of voting BN in 2004 and 1.5 to 1 odds in 1999. These Odds-Ratio 0.53 0.76 Odds-ratio 2004 to 1999 Majority and mixed=1.43 numbers are higher than in bumiputera majority or bumiputera minority constituencies, which recorded a combined probability of voting BN of 60.3 per cent in 2004 and 54.5 per cent in 1999. To compare the relative performance between constituencies in the mixed category and those in the non-mixed categories, odds-ratios were calculated. In 2004, the odds-ratio was 1.5 to 1 for mixed constituencies over non-mixed constituencies in favour of BN. However, the likelihood of the voter voting for the BN in 1999 indicated an odds ratio of 1.2. This suggests that there were much better odds in favour of the BN in 2004 compared to 1999 in both types of constituencies, particularly in mixed constituencies. The above voting behaviour contrasts with the trend in bumiputera minority constituencies where the probability of voting BN was 50.4 per cent in 2004 and 50.7 per cent in 1999. Expressed as odds, the numbers are 1.0 to 1 in 2004 and 1.0 to 1 in 1999 indicating that, in straight contests between BN and Keadilan and between BN and PAS, and BN and DAP, the vote could go either way. In calculating the odds-ratios between bumiputera minority constituencies and the nonmixed constituencies, the figure 0.5 to 1 and 0.8 to 1 for 2004 and 1999 were obtained indicating a general underperformance by BN in both years. The odds-ratios comparing 2004 and 1999 turned out to be 0.99 to 1 in bumiputera minority constituencies and 1.4 to 1 in mixed and bumiputera majority constituencies combined. These ratios show a marginal decline in BN's performance in the two elections in bumiputera minority constituencies but a much better outcome among the mixed and bumiputera majority constituencies combined over the two elections. The situation in bumiputera majority constituencies (both high and absolute majority categories) indicated a stark increase in voting BN in 2004 where the probability was 63 per cent contrasting with the much lower 55.5 per cent in 1999. Expressed in terms of odds they were thus 1.7 to 1 in 2004 and 1.25 to 1 in 1999. To gauge how the odds in bumiputera majority constituencies faired relative to mixed and bumiputera minority constituencies combined, the weaker odds of 0.92 in 2004 and 0.91 in 1999 indicates the BN had performed better albeit marginally in both elections in the bumiputera majority category.
The foregoing analysis shows the BN performing much better in mixed constituencies and slightly better in bumiputera majority constituencies, thus, confirming the importance of the mixed constituencies for BN's victory. The outcome was unpredictable in the bumiputera minority category where probabilities of voting BN in both elections were 50 per cent. The hiatus between the elections of 1999 and 2004 shows the BN performing generally better, the exception being in bumiputera minority areas where the odds ratio in favour of the BN had fallen marginally.
The 1999 elections were contested in an atmosphere where the government was facing some of its most serious political setbacks. Mahathir's sacking of, and subsequent arrest and imprisonment of the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Anwar Ibrahim in 1997 had helped ignite the reformasi (reformation) movement in the country. Drawing inspiration from the reformasi campaign in Indonesia, it likewise pressed for greater democratization at home.
Malaysia had begun to make tentative steps toward economic recovery after being badly hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis triggered by the devaluation of the Thai baht. The Anwar corruption and sodomy trials, which began in 1998, were seen by many as making a mockery of the judiciary and smacking of executive interference in the judicial process. Against this backdrop, it was not surprising that non-BN -in particular the BA -was bullish of its chances in the parliamentary elections as was indeed confirmed by the election results.
The elections -though won by BN -was an endorsement (if only of sorts) of BA's reformasi campaign which managed to secure 43.3 per cent of the popular votes. The BN on the other hand saw its share decline to 56.6 per cent. The BA was particularly successful in capturing a significant proportion of the ethnic votes cast in bumiputera (particularly Malay) majority constituencies and bumiputera minority constituencies. The principal gainers were PAS and DAP while Keadilan led by the wife of the imprisoned Anwar made an impressive first showing, winning 11.4 per cent of the popular votes.
That BN was able to, in spite of the formidable challenge posed by the opposition, win two-thirds of seats in parliament stemmed from the crucial role played by voters in mixed constituencies.
If in 1999 the reformasi movement had mounted a major challenge to the BN, that movement's impact appears to have been muted in 2004. Factors such as adverse effects of globalization on jobs, terrorist threats, the ongoing separatist movement in southern Thailand which did much damage to properties and loss of lives, the Bali bombing in October 2002 and consequent loss of tourism to Malaysia as well as the counterterrorism campaign against the Al-Qaeda linked Jemaah Islamiyah undoubtedly played a role in attracting support for BN, helping to recoup some of the ethnic vote. But it was in bumiputera majority and bumiputera minority constituencies that BN faced stiffer contest from non-BN ethnic-based parties -particularly from PAS. The departure of Mahathir from the political scene and subsequent appointment of Badawi as his successor appears to have had a positive effect on UMNO unity, sealing, if only temporarily, the gaping chasm created by factionalism. Mahathir's leadership had been blighted by bitter in-fighting, manifesting in UMNO's poor showing in the 1999 elections.
Within BN, Mahathir's orchestration of the departure of Ling Liong Sik as president of the MCA, a senior member of the coalition, allowing a younger group of leaders to take over the helm, helped contain elite factionalism. This intervention together with the push to introduce English as the medium of instruction in teaching maths and science in primary and secondary schools was warmly received by Chinese and Indian sections of the electorate, not withstanding initial reservations of Dong Zhiong, the Chinese education lobby. The impact of the above issues among Malay and Chinese voters has boosted BN's popularity. In addition, the deficit spending strategy adopted by Mahathir's administration in the wake of the 1997 slump and higher petroleum output allowed the government to continue to stimulate economic growth, contributing to an economic turnaround. The government went to the polls with the image of a successful crisis manager appeasing concerns, principally among Malays, over the adverse impact of globalization on socio-economic advancement.
The BN's impressive gains in mixed constituencies in 2004 through the strong anti-communal vote were crucial in ensuring it secured two-thirds majority in parliament. The implications of this once again affirms the salience of mixed constituencies for BN in future elections. The fact that BN has done well in bumiputera majority constituencies indicates that it will now have to deliver the economic goods to the constituents. Badawi's pre-and post-election focus on rural development appears to be geared to this end since any shortcomings in this regard can be expected to have repercussions for BN's support in future elections. The ruling coalition managed to do better in bumiputera majority constituencies while its performance in bumiputera minority constituencies was lacklustre, indicating that ethnic-based concerns continue to inform the electorate. In mixed constituencies anticommunal voting greatly helped BN. To be sure, the elections confirmed that locality, temporality (the intervening period between elections), the creation of new constituencies and first-past-the-post electoral system in Malaysia have in the main worked to BN's advantage to secure a comfortable two-thirds majority. The BN's 2004 electoral victory can also be interpreted as a form of endorsement of the UMNO-led coalition government's socio-economic policies to promote stability and pluralism in multi-ethnic Malaysia. Ratnam and Milne, 1970, p. 221. 7 The term bumiputera refers to the Malays, the tribal groups in peninsular Malaysia, and the indigenous groups of Sabah and Sarawak. Under the country's Federal Constitution the bumiputera are singled out in terms of privileged access to jobs in the public sector, scholarships, and business licences. The non-bumiputera who are denied such privileges comprise ethnic Indians, ethnic Chinese, and the "others" precluded from the two categories such as Sri Heng from the Centre for Policy Research. The application of this model to election data in Malaysia is in accordance with the fact that voters are not randomly distributed, but rather different categories of electorate indicate relative differences in ethnic composition as seen in Table 4 . This model allows too for a more sophisticated application of the election data, rather than inferences based on simple calculations of percentage changes.
Conclusion

NOTES
